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LEGITIMATING GLOBALIZATION: CULTURE AND ITS USES

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I. AN AD¹

“What we need to understand is not what culture is, but how people *use the term* in contemporary discourse.”²

In the summer of 2001, television channels in India ran an advertisement for a particular brand of bath soap. The ad portrays a young woman, possibly in her late twenties, driving a car—one of the foreign cars that have made their presence felt over the last ten years in Indian cities, a convertible with the top down. She wears large sunglasses, her scarf flying in the wind, a tank top and shorts, and has music blaring from the CD player in the car. The setting is rural India, and the woman is seemingly making a long trip somewhere. The sun burns down on her as the car passes some women walking with pots of water on their heads. The women are dressed in what look like “designer-traditional” clothes, perhaps ones made authentic by the fashion designers of Indian chic, who have seen an increase in their ilk after the successful number of beauty queens that India has churned out with predictability over the last few years.

As the woman in the car passes by the women with the pots, she gets an idea, screeches the car to a halt, gets out, comes running back to the women with the pots and gestures to them. No words are spoken throughout the ad. The woman's wild gestures do not seem to make sense to the rural women; they just stare in puzzlement at her for a few seconds. They also seem to be making fun (or speaking with hushed admiration, but with coy gestures) of the strangely dressed woman gesticulating wildly. Finally, in frustration, the *128 woman in the shorts and tank top walks up to one rural woman and takes her pot of water from her head and throws it all over herself, to relieve herself of perspiration and heat. Taking this as a cue, all the other rural women instantly take their pots from their heads and throw their water all over the woman's body to help cool and freshen her. The background music begins, and we are treated to some scenes of the woman using the soap to freshen up on the roads of rural India, while the rural women scream with pleasure, ostensibly from watching the urban woman's body undulating in pleasure and, perhaps more importantly, from the pure joy of giving and participation.

Its mildly absurd humor notwithstanding, the ad had all the ingredients of what has been called “multinational” or “late capitalism” or simply “globalization,” packaged wonderfully within its twenty-second lifetime—the coming together of multinational capital, markets, and communicative technologies that shape consumption. Thus we have the *multinational* company selling its bath soap³ through careful selection of *markets* using expert knowledge,⁴ and *cable television* producing consuming citizens in India with the latest digital technologies. Further, even in such an obviously crafted

image, we get to see the *unevenness* of globalization; it was always the urban woman who displayed the key subjectivity for the citizen of a globalized world—the *consuming* subject. In this ad, such status comes with independence (traveling alone as a woman in India still contrasts with the lives of most rural women), mobility (the car), and commodity choice (the choice of a particular soap from a range of options). Finally, we can even detect the erasure of national boundaries to some degree. The urban woman may very well have been a foreigner. She surely must have looked like one to the rural women—very light skinned, with strange language skills, and dressed like *129 foreigners who appear in movies and ads on Indian television.⁵ All of this has been quite “normal” on Indian television for some time now.

However, what struck me as particularly poignant in this ad was the ease of participation of the rural women in serving the needs of the urban woman. They were shown as non-coercively participating in what can be called “a few globalized moments,” even though they did not ostensibly benefit (in the ad) from the key gifts of globalization—the car (signifying mobility and independence) or the soap.⁶ Further, there is no protest here, only assenting participation of all as full actors in the globalized drama. It was not problematic to the rural women that their participation came at the cost of their entire labor-power residing in their water-pots (probably filled after walking many miles to get the water for their families). On the contrary, their obliging care emerges innocently, even when the urban woman had no words to convey her needs. As a viewer, I was left with questions in my mind: Why did the rural women throw the water from their pots so that the spoiled urban woman could freshen herself on the roads of rural India? More importantly, what purposes do ads such as these serve in discursively framing the social phenomenon of globalization?

Social realities are not, however, as clear as the ad is in depicting an easy sense of participation. The history of globalization (either the short version, dating from the emergence of multinational capital, or the long version, dating from the emergence of a one world-system and monopoly capital) is filled with protests of all kinds, from the earliest ones, like those in Dickens' novels through the ages of colonialism and imperialism, to the latest ones in Prague, Davos, Seattle, Bangalore, Porto Alegre, and La Paz.

In such an historic epoch, “globalization,” if spoken of as non-coercive, performs the same function as ideology: it reproduces power by *naturalizing* it. I argue that the way in which this ad uses rural women to represent sectional interests and subjectivities as inevitable or universal is an ideological legitimization of globalization. The naturalization of power is done in two simultaneous moments. One disguises power by representing particular *values* (such as independence, mobility, commodity choice) as general human values available (and desirable) to all, and thus concealing the power *130 relations (and its history) between the “haves” and the “have-nots.” The other makes adoption of those values (what is really “power-in-disguise”) appear inevitable or natural (non-coercive, non-imposed, and deriving from laws of human progress), so that any protest or resistance to them will appear reactionary or doomed to failure. Of course, I remind myself that this is just an ad. However, ads are also ultimate fantasies that express the desires of their creators, who are critical players in shaping the content of globalization. The next section focuses on one such shaper of our conceptions of globalization, John Tomlinson.

II. TOMLINSON'S CONCEPT

In his now classic book, the cultural critic and communications studies specialist, John Tomlinson, focuses on the *language* used to speak of globalization.⁷ His goal is to make a strong case against use of the phrase “cultural imperialism” to represent the effects of globalization. By carefully analyzing the contexts in which cultural imperialism is used as a mark of protest, Tomlinson shows how each of its many different senses connotes a power-relation that is an imposition or *coercion*. He argues, however, that such a language is appropriate only for the project of imperialism and not for globalization. Thus, he views the use of a language of cultural imperialism for protests against globalization's effects as inappropriate:

However, these protests are often formulated in an inappropriate language of domination, a language of cultural imposition which draws its imagery from the age of high imperialism and colonialism. Such images ... invoke an idea of cultural imposition by *coercion* What dogs the critique of cultural imperialism is the problem of explaining how a cultural practice can be imposed in a context which is no longer actually coercive.⁸

The crucial point is Tomlinson's understanding that the element of coercion that is key for an imperial project is missing in the project of globalization, therefore making the language of the former inappropriate for describing the latter. I will argue in the next two sections that such a claim (widely shared by many scholars and policy makers) rests on a peculiar understanding of culture and that explicating this becomes critical in facing globalization's myriad potentials and threats. However, before going further we must bear in mind that Tomlinson is neither an unabashed celebrator of the cultural vitality of globalization, nor does he view globalization as a threat on the grounds that cultural homogeneity is globalization's potential future. Rather, he is struggling to produce an analysis of globalization that rejects both the above positions. Tomlinson ironically seems interested in ***131** ultimately saving the sense of genuine *protest* contained within the term "cultural imperialism." He is at pains only to explain what cultural imperialism is all about and why the term is inappropriate for describing globalization.

So, what does Tomlinson offer as an alternative way of speaking (or protesting) against globalization's effects? According to him, protests against globalization's perceived effects, which are expressed in the language of cultural imperialism, are better expressed in the language of "cultural loss." "The cultural impact of capitalist modernity can be seen more in terms of *loss* than of *imposition*."⁹ Further, along the lines of Anthony Giddens and the idea of the lack of "moral legitimacy" of capitalist modernity,¹⁰ Tomlinson argues that this cultural loss is itself due to the "cultural weakness" of capitalist modernity; a weakness that is unable to solve the problems that the material effects of capitalism bring in their wake. He expresses his point thus:

But if one central theme runs through them all [referring to the various senses of the discourses of 'cultural imperialism'] it is the claim that people need something modernity has not properly provided. This is a need *not for material well-being, or political emancipation*, but a specifically cultural need: to be able to decide how we will live collectively in the widest possible sense—what we will value, what we will believe in, what sense we will make of our everyday lives.¹¹

In making the claim that protests against globalization are about *culture* although not about cultural *imperialism*, Tomlinson shares a platform with scholars such as Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama who are quite unlike him on many counts, but who also speak in cultural as opposed to economic and political terms.

Finally, Tomlinson locates the cause of cultural weakness of modernity in the lack of "cultural coherence" that characterizes the ways in which people experience globalization. Thus, "[t]he cultural experience of people caught up in these processes [of globalization] is likely to be one of confusion, uncertainty and the perception of powerlessness."¹² Simply put, unlike imperialism, which was at least a coherent ideological project, globalization is incoherent, *ideologically* speaking, at least for Tomlinson.¹³ He argues that ***132** globalization's effects are unintended, which in turn creates "cultural confusion" for all people, including the privileged few who are part of the "decentered core" of globalization.¹⁴ Tomlinson thus presents a neat series of discursive effects that tell us what protests against globalization are all about. Briefly, his arguments present protests against globalization as deriving from a cultural weakness of capitalist modernity that accounts for modernity's cultural incoherence, which leads to cultural confusion among people who experience

modernity (and globalization), and which ultimately leads to a “cultural loss.” This sense of cultural loss seems to be the final referent of protests for Tomlinson. Needless to say, such a representation of protests is quite different from viewing them as protests against cultural imperialism with its connotations of coercion and intentionality.

It is useful to consider where Tomlinson's analysis could ultimately lead him. If globalization is indeed characterized by cultural loss in the sense that Tomlinson indicates, then he is right that more and more people around the globe will share what he calls the cultural fate of being within capitalist modernity. He sums up his thesis thus: “[a]s global cultures fall into the conditions of modernity through the *spread* of the institutions of modernity, they *all face the same problem* of the failure of a collective will to generate shared narratives of meaning and orientation.”¹⁵

The rest of this article, taking inspiration from the epigram to the essay, will argue that Tomlinson's use of the concept of “culture” leads him to theorize about non-coercive cultural loss and inevitable cultural fates as the referent and causes of protests against globalization. It will then use some examples of protest against globalization from India to show how Tomlinson's claim of cultural loss is quite inappropriate in grasping what these protests may be all about.

III. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST TOMLINSON'S INTERPRETATION

Tomlinson uses culture to refer to “the *context* within which people give *meanings* to their actions and experiences, and make sense of their lives.”¹⁶ He distinguishes cultural practices in this sense from economic practices that deal with the satisfaction of material needs and political practices that deal with the distribution of, and struggle over, power.¹⁷ Tomlinson uses this understanding of culture as context in making three related claims about protests.

*133 Protests are about *cultural loss*.¹⁸ This is the negative or critical dimension of protests. Such a loss of context (i.e., culture) takes place “through the *spread* of modernity.”¹⁹ Cultural loss is thus not a result of coercion.²⁰

Protests are consequently expressions of people for “the need for viable communities of cultural judgment.”²¹ This is the positive or creative dimension of protests. This is primarily because “people's experiences are shaped by processes that operate on a global level—and this level is beyond our present powers of imagination.”²² Unlike imagining national communities and identities, it is not possible to imagine global identities simply because there are no representations available to us at present that speak to such a level of identity.

Let us briefly consider Tomlinson's use of the term “loss” in making the above arguments. The Merriam-Webster dictionary gives many meanings for “loss,” including loss as *accidental* (losing a possession by misplacing it; losing one's way), loss as a *choice* (losing a pursuer), loss as *natural* (hair loss), and loss as *personal responsibility* (losing one's temper).²³ All these senses seem to fit with Tomlinson's use of the term cultural loss. But the dictionary gives two additional meanings that Tomlinson does not consider. One is the sense of loss as *derived from rules* (loss according to the rules of a game), and the other is a sense of loss as a *consequence of destruction*. The latter is buried within the Old English sense of loss and the Greek sense of loss—*lyein*. Both these senses highlight the operation of power—to define and control the rules of a game in the former sense, and to be the agent of destruction in the latter sense. The anthropologist Eric Wolf captures both these senses in his concept of “structural power” as a mode of power that “not only operates within settings or domains, but ... also organizes and orchestrates the settings themselves, and ... specifies the distribution and direction of energy flows.”²⁴

*134 Following the epigram that begins this essay, we can now address a question that Tomlinson does not pose when he uses the term culture. If culture is the context within which people produce meanings that helps make sense of their life experiences, then what is it that produces the context? In other words, is there a difference between viewing culture as the context within which meanings are made, and culture as meaning-making within contexts that are themselves

produced by economic, political, and (previous) cultural practices/processes? I argue that this distinction is crucial to understanding the power of ideology at work in Tomlinson's use of *culture as context*. His usage leaves culture as an idealized object or matrix of objects, not unlike the codes that cognitive and ethnomethodologist anthropologists reveal as a people's culture. If instead, culture was *meaning-making within context*, then culture appears as a sensuous and interactive practice of people making meaning (cultural dimension) within contexts (economic, political, and cultural).

Such a distinction allows an analysis of the numerous actual statements of protest against globalization, which do not seem to clearly distinguish loss of meaning-making capabilities from material needs and power in the way that Tomlinson does. Tomlinson's understanding of culture as context rather than culture in context seems to fatally isolate narratives of meaning out of their political economy, and enable a masking of the coercion that is ever-present within globalization.

Needless to say, Tomlinson's further use of terms such as cultural fate represents globalization as inevitable, and does nothing to instill hope for or illuminate the basis and need for genuine protest. More importantly, in attributing his version of cultural fate to the globe as a whole, Tomlinson does not do justice to the question of *difference*. Globalization is experienced in very different ways, especially across class, gender, race, caste and national lines, the last-mentioned axis being far from the kind of shadowy lines spoken of by enthusiastic heralds of a new era of global citizenship where national boundaries become obsolete. To paraphrase from the work of the economists Lash and Urry, it may be argued, *contra* to Tomlinson, that the cultural confusion and cultural loss that Tomlinson speaks of as characterizing *all protests*, is perhaps more correctly part of the "destructured and decentered *habitus*" of one class: the professionalized service classes in the First World (and also in parts of the Third World) that may be said to be living truly globalized lives supported by strong passports and currency.²⁵ This class, operating in the more globalized realms of the economy and located in the more globalized spaces of the world, experiences globalization quite differently from the bulk of humanity, and is therefore also distinguishable in its protests (if and when they occur) from the bulk of humanity. Tomlinson thus moves too quickly in assigning blame (for *135 globalization's ills) at the level of a general existential failure of modernity to help people make sense of their lives.

In sum, Tomlinson's own use of the term "culture" and argument against cultural imperialism ideologically mask globalization's coercive character. He accomplishes this by passing off what belongs to and emanates from a particular class, its peculiarly postmodern-sense of "cultural loss" of legitimating narratives to *understand* life, as if it also characterizes all protests against globalization. In particular, I am interested in showing the existence of another kind of protest that is far more common, and which can be described as a modern, albeit underdeveloped, sense of loss. The loss is produced by destruction of the political, economic, and cultural context and resources to *sustain* life. This kind of protest mostly occurs in, but is not restricted to, the so-called Third World. It is true that the "global" is everywhere, and the works of scholars such as Wallerstein, Wolf, Stavrianos and others from the "invention of tradition" school of thought show how the global may indeed have produced the local for much of history; but it is also useful to remember that globalization's effects are not the same everywhere.²⁶

IV. THE PROTESTORS AS ILLUSTRATIONS

This final section provides some examples of protest from India to highlight alternative senses that the term "context" means for protestors or their interlocutors. These protests are not, as Tomlinson suggests, expressing global angst about cultural loss against the cultural fate of modernity's victims. They are instead, better spoken of as expressions of globally produced local anger at globally produced destructions of globally produced local contexts. It is important to speak of global productions of the local, locality, and localness, in order to avoid some of the pitfalls of posing an innocent local to a hegemonic global. The context of culture, or meaning production, in each of these protests may be seen to refer to a number of political-economic aspects of living: the local environment that protestors live in, the ecology of the region, the working conditions for the protestors, their diminishing access to sustainable livelihoods, and finally, the very bodies of the protestors.

In fact, we must argue here for an approach to understanding that protests are based upon views of the economic, political, and cultural as three dimensions of social reality. Therefore, any attempt to portray only one of these dimensions as representing all of the reality of protests is unnecessarily partial. Additionally, protests against globalization derive from people's *ability* rather than their *inability* to make sense of their lives. Such a conclusion may also be derived from the works of scholars who argue that globalization has also heightened or intensified a “feeling or knowledge” *136 about the existence of a “global.”²⁷ It is not surprising then, that many contemporary protests address global powers and links even when they are located far away from metropolitan nodes of power. The streets of Seattle in late 1999 were only the most dramatic of such protests because of their prominent location. Many of my references for the protests examined within this article come from internet-based publications. This is itself an indication of the increasingly networked nature of protests, and their immense fund of information and knowledge of globalized contexts.

Take the case of a popular multinational today, Unilever. Unilever, in its Indian avatar of Hindustan Lever Ltd., was caught dumping toxic mercury waste from a thermometer factory in Southern India early in 2002.²⁸ More than 400 residents of Kodaikanal (the locale of the factory and scrap yard) marched to the factory gates in protest. Unilever imports all the mercury and glass for the thermometers from the United States, and exports all the finished thermometers to the U.S.-based Faichney Medical Company. From there, the thermometers find their way into markets in the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, Germany, and Spain. At least for the people of Kodaikanal's Lever factory, they are employees of a global enterprise.

The workers of this factory demanded that their health records, maintained within the company, be handed over to an independent assessment agency to determine the impact of mercury exposure on their health. The workers spoke of Unilever's casual attitude towards the toxic mercury at the shop floor:

‘When I worked there, they used to suck up the mercury from the floor using a vacuum cleaner once a day. In another section, where they heat thermometers in an oven, workers are exposed to gusts of mercury vapor every time the oven door is opened,’ says Mahendra Babu, an ex-worker who has been active in organizing the workers against the company's lax occupational safety practices. A local doctor who spoke on condition of anonymity says, ‘Most of those working there [at Unilever] get affected, mainly in the kidneys. I advise all of them that the only cure is to quit their jobs, and many do. Others suffer stomach pains, burning sensation while passing urine.’ Mercury exposure is known to cause kidney disorders.²⁹

From the above statements, we may deduce that what is being protested is a loss of context in the sense of working conditions, health, ecology (since the factory is also located on the slopes of one of India's forest ecosystem and *137 major watersheds), and *trust*, as evinced by the following statement from Minoos Awari, an old-time resident of Kodaikanal: “It's been a learning experience that a reputed multinational could behave this way. As a host community we feel cheated.”³⁰ Nowhere do the protestors mention cultural confusion or a loss of an understanding of what is happening to them. The last statement on being cheated is itself an indication of ability to make sense of one's life.

Or consider the case of the Norwegian company Norsk Hydro, which along with Alcan (a Canadian multinational) and Hindalco (an Indian company) planned to mine bauxite in Orissa from tribal lands through a joint venture with another Indian company Utkal Alumina Industries Ltd. When it came to light in 1994 that the tribals, whose lands were supposed to be protected from appropriation by non-tribals under Indian law, were protesting, the companies made numerous attempts to coerce them into ceding their lands for monetary compensation. In this context, one of the conveners of the Orissa Tribal People's Forum said in protest: “We are not interested in the compensation offered by the bauxite companies; we want to continue as farmers on this land which has sustained us for centuries.”³¹ Clearly the context within which protesters here make sense of their lives incorporates their political rights (in a modern India) to a

livelihood, coercion into giving up their preferred form of livelihood (signified by the violence that ensued in this case), and the culturally meaningful ways in which the tribals view their relationship to their occupation, land, and ancestors. It is not at all a protest against a loss of legitimating narratives.

Similar arguments may be made for the burning of copies of the Andhra Pradesh (a southern Indian state) State Government's New Agricultural Policy and the Land Reform Amendment Act by activists and farmers protesting, above all, the introduction of genetically modified seeds, and insurance policies that left farmers more vulnerable than before. These copies were burnt in the context of the mass suicides of cotton farmers and handloom weavers, who killed themselves by consuming pesticides. The protest campaign against the multinational seed company Monsanto ran under the following slogans: "stop genetic engineering," "no patents on life," "cremate Monsanto," and "bury the World Trade Organization." There is also a more specific message directed at all those who had invested in Monsanto: "You should take your money out before we reduce it to ashes."³² These actions were the start of a direct action campaign by farmers against biotechnology, called Operation Cremation Monsanto. Surely, such protests *138 refer to the loss as destruction of livelihood, and control over one's life and family by the changing economic and political rules of the game.

What we can learn from the protests in India is that protests are not simply protests against cultural loss in the sense of a loss of narratives of meanings or the loss of context for making meaning. Instead, protests seem to be capably articulating meaning by pointing to the process of the loss (through destruction deriving from the rules of the globalization game) of material and political basis of contexts within which community and meaning can be imagined and built. Protestors make meaning within contexts even as they protest the destruction of those contexts. This is why we must admit that globalization is not hegemonic, i.e., built upon some form of assent (though always backed by force). We can see this in the strange phenomenon of force and destruction existing simultaneously with the rise in the hiring of management consultants in public relations firms to control opinion and public image of globalization. Thus, we have the U.N.'s Global Compact³³ (signed by Unilever and Norsk-Hydro), and firms like Enron (sued for human rights violations and now large-scale financial pillage) hiring public relations firms.³⁴ In keeping with a long tradition in history, consent is bought as a commodity, giving the image of the dream world portrayed in the ad described at the beginning of this article. Perhaps that is why even the 1999 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland had its foremost speakers address the need to have "globalization with a human face."³⁵ This is, of course, felt as necessary simply because it does not exist at present.

Footnotes

- a1 Assistant Professor of Anthropology, Iowa State University.
- 1 The section headings for this essay are inspired by the movie "THE COOK, THE THIEF, HIS WIFE AND HER LOVER" (Miramax Films 1989), but the resemblance is purely one of form.
- 2 JOHN TOMLINSON, *CULTURAL IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION* 5 (1991).
- 3 See Hindustan Lever Limited Homepage, at <http://www.hll.com> (last visited Nov. 17, 2002). The Indian Hindustan Lever's parent company is Unilever, which holds 51% of the equity. A Fortune 500 transnational company, Unilever sells foods and home and personal care brands through 300 subsidiaries in eighty-eight countries worldwide with products for sale in a further seventy. Unilever's foods and home and personal care brands are chosen by individual consumers 150 million times a day. *Id.*
- 4 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, FY2000 *Country Commercial Guide: India*, at http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/com_guides/2000/sa/india_CCG2000.pdf.
India, with a population of nearly a billion people, is a country of contrasts. India's urban population is the main engine that fuels the demand for various cosmetic products. Although Indians are strongly attached and committed to their traditions, [sic] and culture, the advent of television and the awareness of the western world is changing the tastes, [sic] and customs of India. The 'morphing' of India is subtle, and the changes are not visible for the first time visitor. However, the market

liberalization process that began in 1991, along with the crowning of three Indians as Miss World and Miss Universe during the past four years, has made Indian women conscious of their appearance. Consequently, the cosmetic consumption patterns of Indian women have changed, and this trend is fueling growth in the cosmetic sector.

Id.

5 The erasure of national identities is a major theme of globalization. It remains to be seen if this is also an evolving possibility of people grouping along social class lines rather than national cultural lines. See Frederic Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late-Capitalism*, 1/146 NEW LEFT REV., July-Aug. 1984, at 53-92. It is, nevertheless, quite true that elites have begun to look and live alike across nations.

6 I would also go further and argue that although the ad is for the soap, it is not the soap that is being sold here as much as globalization itself through the car and its accoutrements. Rural Indian women have had access to commercially produced soaps (many of them made locally) long before the current phase of capitalism (i.e., globalization) arrived. Of course, it is also important to note the “impurity” of local traditions—local soaps were produced by global forces (India provided raw materials for soaps made in England during the heydays of colonialism and industrialization, and English soaps model as inspiration for soaps made in India, albeit of a lower quality, befitting underdeveloped countries).

7 TOMLINSON, *supra* note 2.

8 *Id.* at 173.

9 *Id.* at 164.

10 *Id.* at 174 (quoting Giddens).

11 *Id.* at 169 (emphasis added).

12 TOMLINSON, *supra* note 2, at 176.

13 On this issue, Tomlinson builds upon the work of economists Lash and Urry who themselves build upon the work of Jameson (1984). SCOTT LASH & JOHN URRY, *THE END OF ORGANIZED CAPITALISM* 296 (1987); SCOTT LASH & JOHN URRY, *ECONOMIES OF SIGNS AND SPACE* (1994); Jameson, *supra* note 5.

14 FREDERICK BUELL, *NATIONAL CULTURE AND THE NEW GLOBAL SYSTEM* (1994).

15 TOMLINSON, *supra* note 2, at 165 (emphasis added).

16 BUELL, *supra* note 14, at 7.

17 *Id.*

18 *Id.* at 173.

19 TOMLINSON, *supra* note 2, at 173 (emphasis added).

20 *Id.* In his more recent book, Tomlinson builds upon his earlier work and expresses his ideas on the relationship between globalization and modernity along the lines of both Featherstone's “global modernity” and Giddens' globalization as the consequence of modernity. JOHN TOMLINSON, *GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE* (1999). However, the need to preserve the idea of globalization as an incoherent and non-directed process, along the lines of Lash and Urry's “globalization as a disorganized process,” *supra* note 13, seems to give rise to an understanding of globalization as inevitable, and as some naturalized phenomenon to be captured by the descriptive (rather than analytic) term “spread.”

21 TOMLINSON, *supra* note 2, at 178.

22 *Id.* at 177 (TOMLINSON, quoting Jameson, *supra* note 5).

23 Online Merriam-Webster dictionary, at <http://www.m-w.com> (last visited Nov. 17, 2002).

24 Eric Wolf, *Distinguished Lecture: Facing Power—Old Insights, New Questions*, 92 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 586 (1990).

- 25 LASH & URRY, *supra* note 13.
- 26 See e.g., IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, GLOBALIZATION OR THE AGE OF TRANSITION? A LONG-TERM VIEW OF THE TRAJECTORY OF THE WORLD-SYSTEM (1999), available at <http://fbc.binghamton.edu/iwtrajws.htm>; Wolf, *supra* note 24, at 586-96.
- 27 See e.g., ROLAND ROBERTSON, GLOBALIZATION: SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL CULTURE (1992); MALCOLM WATERS, GLOBALIZATION (2001); TOMLINSON, *supra* note 2.
- 28 Nityanand Jayaraman, *Unilever's Mercury Fever*, CorpWatch India (2001), at <http://www.corpwatchindia.org/issues/PID.jsp?articleidW143> (last visited Nov. 17, 2002).
- 29 *Id.*
- 30 *Id.*
- 31 Nityanand Jayaraman, *Norsk Hydro: Global Compact Violator*, CorpWatch India (2001), at <http://www.corpwatchindia.org/issues/PID.jsp?articleidW444> (last visited Nov. 17, 2002).
- 32 Ethical Investing, *Monsanto's Genetically-Manipulated Crop Field to be Destroyed by Farmers in India*, at <http://www.ethicalinvesting.com/monsanto/news/10023.htm> (last visited Nov. 17, 2002).
- 33 The Global Compact is a U.N.-sponsored initiative launched in July 2000 that seeks to improve corporate practices in the arenas of human rights, environment and labor practices. It is currently purely voluntary and has led to charges of cooptation of the U.N. by corporations seeking legitimacy, at www.unglobalcompact.org, www.corpwatch.org (providing information on the strengths and weaknesses of this Compact).
- 34 ABHAY MEHTA, POWER PLAY: A STUDY OF THE ENRON PROJECT 121 (1999). By its own admission before the U.S. House Committee on Appropriations in 1995, Enron employee Linda Powers admitted that Enron spent a hefty USD \$20 million in “educating” India’s politicians, bureaucrats, and authorities on the project.
- 35 World Economic Forum, *Globalization with a Human Face: Towards a Values-Added Society* (1999), at <http://www.davos.org/site/knowledgenavigator.nsf/Content/Globalization%20with%20a%20Human%20Face:%20Towards%20a%20Values-Added%20Society> (last visited Nov. 17, 2002).

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